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ENTEK GRB, LLC V. STULL RANCHES, LLC: UPHOLDING
THE DOMINANCE OF THE MINERAL ESTATE
INTRODUCTION
Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC1 addressed a common dispute in the western United States—a dispute between the surface owner
and the mineral owner of a severed estate. As Judge Gorsuch articulated
in Entek: “When you own property in the West you don't always own
everything from the surface to the center of the Earth. Someone else
might own the minerals lying underground and the right to access them.
Someone else still might own the right to use the water flowing through
your property. All this can invite confusion—and litigation.”2
A severed estate occurs when different parties own the surface
rights and minerals rights on a single parcel of land.3 Severed estates are
generally the result of the federal government reserving the mineral
rights from land patents or private parties granting or reserving mineral
interests.4 The mineral estate is generally considered the dominant estate,
which allows its owner to reasonably use the surface estate to develop
the minerals underlying the property.5 There are limits on the mineral
estate’s dominance, however, through principles such as the accommodation doctrine.6
Another key component of Entek was that the mineral rights to the
parcels in question had been joined together through a concept called
unitization.7 Unitization is a method of conservation that the oil and gas
industry uses to prevent waste.8 Some commentators have suggested that
it is the best method of conservation.9 Unitization combines multiple
tracts of land with separate owners overlying all or part of a common
mineral reservoir for joint recovery operations.10 Generally, the working

1.
2.
3.

763 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1253.
Andrew C. Mergen, Surface Tension: The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands,
33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419, 423 (1998).
4. Robert E. Witwer, Tension Beneath the Surface: The Evolving Relationship Between
Surface and Mineral Estates, 30 COLO. LAW. 67, 67 (2001).
5. Mergen, supra note 3, at 432.
6. Id. at 433.
7. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the Focus Ranch Unit Agreement “includes the relevant potions of Stull’s surface estate and
BLM’s land”).
8. Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, III, The Use of Law to Promote Domestic Exploration and Production, in Fiftieth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 2-1, 2-64 to 2-65
(Carol J. Holgren ed., 1999).
9. Id. at 2-64.
10. JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 752 (6th ed. 2013).
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interest owners11 of at least 85% of the acres within a proposed unit must
agree to cooperative development in order to form a unitization plan.12
The Secretary of the Interior must approve the unitization plans.13 The
Secretary must determine that the unit plan is “necessary or advisable in
the public interest” to approve it and may alter the leases included in the
plan to protect the public interest.14 Unitization agreements generally
provide that “operations performed on any tract of unitized lands will be
deemed to be performed upon, and for the benefit of, every . . . tract of
unitized land.”15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primarily relied on the language of the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act, the unitization amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act, and the language of the unitization agreement to find that all of the surface within a
unit should be treated as a single parcel, with respect to mineral development.16 Thus, the court held that Entek GRB, LLC (Entek) had the
right to enter and occupy the surface of any parcel within the unit, so
long as it was reasonably incident to mineral development on the surface
of any parcel within the unit, which included the access road on Stull
Ranches, LLC’s (Stull) property.17
Stull lost this case because it failed to make its argument within the
structure of established mineral law, as incorporated into federal statutes.
If Stull had argued for specific reasonable alternatives to using the road
across its land in accordance with the accommodation doctrine, this case
may have been decided differently.18 This ruling has some implications
for many Western States where severed estates are quite common.19
Surface owners must now be aware that mineral owners may be able to
use the surface owners’ land for mineral development on adjacent parcels, if the leases have been unitized. However, this creates only a slight
variation on the general right of access for mineral owners, and as this
comment will discuss, it is the correct way to deal with surface access
rights for mineral development on unitized lands. Thus, this case likely
does not have significant implications for Western States or the owners
of severed estates.

11. The working interest owner is the person that has the right to “search, develop, and produce oil and gas” on a property. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 515 (6th ed.
2014). This interest is usually granted to a leaseholder, such as Entek in this case. Id. at 46.
12. THOMAS A. MARRANZINO, JESSICA B. PINK & ANNA C. CAVALERI, A PRIMER ON
FEDERAL UNITIZATION, UNIT AGREEMENTS AND UNIT OPERATING AGREEMENTS 6, available at
http://jay.law.ou.edu/faculty/Hampton/Mineral%20Title%20Examination/Spring%202012/Federal%
20Unitization%20Primer%20Tom%20Marranzino.pdf.
13. 30 U.S.C. §226(m) (2014).
14. Id.
15. MARRANZINO ET AL., supra note 12, at 17.
16. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1254–56 (10th Cir. 2014).
17. Id. at 1256.
18. See discussion of the accommodation doctrine infra Part III.B.
19. Marvin D. Truhe, Surface Owner v. Mineral Owner or “They Can’t Do That, Can
They?”, 27 S.D. L. REV. 376, 380 (1981-1982).
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Part I of this comment provides background information on the relevant federal statutes that the court relied upon, as well as the current law
in Colorado relating to unitization of mineral estates. Part II summarizes
the facts, procedural history, and opinion in Entek. Part III discusses the
difficulties of having severed estates and provides some recommendations for easing tensions between the two estates.
I. BACKGROUND
This part discusses the statutes that the Tenth Circuit relied upon to
decide Entek. First, it will discuss the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of
1916, which granted the surface estate to Stull’s successor in interest and
reserved the minerals to the United States. Next, it will examine the Mineral Leasing Act, and the subsequent amendment that allowed for unitization of federal mineral leases. Finally, it will touch on unitization law
in Colorado.
A. Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916
The Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 191620 (SRHA or 1916 Act)
was passed in response to public outcry about the government giving
away the valuable subsurface minerals with the land grants that it was
using to encourage settlement of the west.21 Under the SRHA, the federal
government transferred the surface estate to individual homesteaders but
reserved the mineral estate.22 The SRHA granted larger homesteads than
previous land grants, up to 640 acres.23 Congress passed the Act allowing
the larger grants because the homesteader was gaining only the right to
use the surface without any right to the minerals under the land.24 Only
lands that the Secretary of Interior deemed suitable for stock raising were
open for settlement under the SRHA.25 Additionally, settlers were required to make permanent improvements to the land in the amount of
$1.25 per acre.26 About thirty-three million acres of federal land, primarily in the Western States, were patented to homesteaders under the
SRHA.27
20. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (2014).
21. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1254.
22. Matt Micheli, Showdown at the OK Corral –Wyoming’s Challenge to U.S. Supremacy on
Federal Split Estate Lands, 6 WYO. L. REV. 31, 32 (2006).
23. Id. at 32. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the federal government sold off
federal land to settlers. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO (FRED) CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG,
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 65 (2013). However, the government eventually changed its stance on
federal lands and began granting these western lands to settlers who would occupy and work the
land. Id. The first act that granted land to homesteaders was the Homestead Act of 1862, which
granted 160 acres and, unlike the SRHA, included both the surface and the underlying minerals. Id.
at 65–66.
24. Micheli, supra note 22, at 33.
25. PAUL W. GATES & ROBERT W. SWENSON, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 517 (1968).
26. Id.
27. Truhe, supra note 19, at 382.
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The SRHA altered the established common law regarding surface
owners and mineral owners by providing that the United States, or its
lessees, have the right to enter the land granted under the Act (the surface
estate) to locate the minerals that were reserved to the United States.28
However, the Act provided that the mineral developer must not damage
permanent structures and is liable for any damage to crops.29 The SRHA
gave the mineral developer the right to “re-enter and occupy so much of
the surface thereof as may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining or removal of the coal or other minerals . . . .”30 The
SRHA also set forth the requirements for re-entry: (1) written consent of
the landowner; (2) payment for damages to crops or other tangible improvements; or (3) executing a bond to the United States for the benefit
of the landowner to cover damages to crops or other tangible improvements.31 The legislative history of the SRHA shows that Congress also
intended to reserve the right to modify the surface and mineral owners’
rights, in relation to mineral development, with subsequent legislation.32
B. Mineral Leasing Act and Unitization Amendment
In order to facilitate development of the minerals under the homestead lands, Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act in 1920.33 Originally, the Mineral Leasing Act gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to lease mineral development rights on individual parcels of land to
private parties.34 However, as early as 1916, people began to realize that
regulation of oil and gas development should focus on the geological
structure that the minerals are found in, rather than surface boundaries
overlying the minerals, because oil and gas fields35 do not follow the
surface property lines.36 The idea of cooperative development plans on
public lands was initially dismissed as a potential violation of the antitrust provision of the Mineral Leasing Act.37
Oil and gas fields have traditionally been developed subject to the
rule of capture.38 The rule of capture “gives the surface owner all rights
to oil and gas withdrawn from his land, even though the oil and gas may
28. 43 U.S.C. § 299(a).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Micheli, supra note 22, at 40.
33. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 2014).
34. Id.
35. A field is “[a] geographical area under which an oil or gas reservoir lies.” Glossary of Oil
and Gas Terms, COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION, https://cogcc.state.co.us/
(last visited March 1, 2015).
36. David W. Miller, The Historical Development of the Oil and Gas Laws of the United
States, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 506, 520 (1963).
37. Id. After Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Congress was very
conscious of oil and gas monopolies, so it limited the amount of public land that one person or
company could lease at one time with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Id. at 533.
38. MARRANZINO ET AL., supra note 12, at 1.
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have migrated from pools beneath adjoining lands.”39 This rule caused
developers to produce as much oil or gas as fast as they could, whether
the market needed it or not, to ensure that others with land over the same
oil or gas reservoir did not extract the minerals first.40 So when the Mineral Leasing Act was passed, it is no surprise that oil and gas developers
rushed to claim the newly opened public lands.41 Due to wasteful development and a fear of an oil famine, President Hoover closed the public
lands to further leasing or disposal from March 12, 1929 to April 4,
1932.42
To try to stop this wasteful development of oil and gas fields, Congress passed an amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act in 1931.43 This
amendment allowed all lessees in a single field to develop “a cooperative
or unit plan of development or operation of such pool, field, or like area.”44 This amendment required the Secretary of the Interior to approve
these unitization plans.45 In addition, it granted the Secretary the authority to alter existing federal mineral leases to accommodate the unitization
agreements.46 Under this amendment, production from any well within
the unit would hold all of the leases committed to the unit.47
C. Colorado Unitization Law
Colorado has its own unitization statute.48 The statute authorizes the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to approve combining
leases into a unit if it is “in the public interest for conservation or is reasonably necessary to increase ultimate recovery or to prevent waste of oil
or gas.”49 This statute has a similar provision to the unitization amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act, which states that operations on any
portion of the unit are deemed to be operations on each tract within the
unit.50 Thus, production on one tract of land within the unit is likely to
hold all leases in the unit under the Colorado statute, just as the Mineral
Leasing Act does for federal units. Colorado also has a conservation stat39. Miller, supra note 36, at 518.
40. Id.
41. Id. Within a year after the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act, 5,000 prospecting permit
applications had been filed. JOHN ISE, THE UNITED STATES OIL POLICY 353 (1926). By the end of
June 1924, prospectors had filed a total of 32,103 applications under the Act. Id. However, very few
prospectors actually discovered minerals and were issued a permit. Id.
42. Miller, supra note 36, at 520.
43. Id. at 521. The unitization amendment was passed after a temporary amendment to the
Mineral Leasing Act authorizing cooperative development of the Kettleman Hill Field in California
was successful at eliminating waste. Id. at 520–21.
44. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting
30 U.S.C. §226(m)).
45. 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION §
16.01 (3d ed. Matthew Bender 1989).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-118 (2014).
49. § 34-60-118(1).
50. § 34-60-118(9).
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ute that allows the state to protect landowners’ rights, if operations are
not being conducted properly on federal lands.51 However, the statute
explicitly states that it does not apply to federal units, with a few exceptions.52
II. ENTEK GRB, LLC V. STULL RANCHES, LLC
A. Facts
Stull operates a grouse hunting business on its land in rural Colorado.53 Stull’s’ predecessor in interest obtained the land through a land
grant from the federal government made under the SRHA.54 The 1916
Act granted homesteaders the surface land but reserved the mineral rights
to the federal government.55
Entek holds leases to the minerals under much of Stull’s land and
the adjacent parcels.56 Entek has an existing well on a parcel adjacent to
Stull’s land that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) owns.57 The
Focus Ranch Unit Agreement had combined Entek’s leases to the minerals under both parcels into a unit.58 The Secretary of the Interior approved the Focus Ranch Unit Agreement, which included a total of
40,000 acres.59
Clayton Williams previously held Entek’s leases.60 He went to court
with another landowner, Three Forks Ranch, in an attempt to cross that
surface estate in order to reach a well on an adjacent party’s land.61 The
district court found that the Focus Ranch Unit Agreement did not permit
Mr. Williams to cross the Three Forks Ranch’s land to get to a well on
another property.62 Prior to an appeal, Mr. Williams entered into an
agreement with Stull to cross its land to get to the well.63 However, Stull
eventually cancelled the agreement, and it was never assigned to Entek
when Entek took over the leases.64
There is currently only one road that would allow access to Entek’s
well on the BLM land, and it crosses Stull’s land.65 Entek asked permis51. Kenneth D. Hubbard, The Application of State Conservation Laws to Oil and Gas Operations on the Public Domain, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 109, 124 (1959-1960).
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-120(1)(b) (2013).
53. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014).
54. Id. at 1254.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1253.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1255.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1258.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1253.
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sion to enter Stull’s land to develop new wells on that parcel and to gain
access to the well on the BLM land.66 However, Stull denied access to
Entek because it was concerned that Entek’s presence would be detrimental to its grouse hunting business.67
B. Procedural History
Entek filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado in an attempt to gain access to Stull’s land.68 At summary judgment,
the district court granted Entek access to Stull’s land to conduct mineral
production on that parcel.69 However, it held that Entek could not cross
Stull’s property to gain access to the well on the BLM land.70 Entek appealed to the Tenth Circuit in an attempt to gain access to Stull’s land in
order to access the well on the BLM land.71
C. Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of Judge Brimmer of U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado granting summary judgment
for Stull and remanded the case for further proceedings.72 Circuit Judge
Gorsuch authored the opinion and was joined by Circuit Judges Baldock
and Bacharach.73
This case addressed two issues. First, whether a mineral owner or
lessee can access the surface of a parcel of land to develop minerals on
an adjacent parcel of land when all of the minerals have been placed into
a unit.74 Second, whether nonmutual offensive issue preclusion bars
Entek from arguing for a determination of its rights under the Focus
Ranch Unit Agreement.75
The court relied primarily on the language of the SRHA and the
unitization provision of the 1931 amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act
to determine whether Entek could cross Stull’s land.76 Under the SRHA,
the federal government reserved the right to all of the minerals, the right
to enter and use the surface to explore for and remove the minerals, and
the right enact future laws regarding the disposal of the mineral estate.77
The 1931 amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act allowed lessees to create a cooperative plan to develop the minerals in a larger area more effi66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1252.
See id. at 1253.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1254–56.
Id. at 1254.
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ciently.78 The Secretary of the Interior had to approve these unitization
agreements.79
The Focus Ranch Unit Agreement stated that mineral development
operations on any tract within a unit are “deemed to be performed upon
and for the benefit of each and every tract of unitized land.”80 Additionally, the SRHA reserved the right to enact future laws regarding the disposal of minerals.81 So even if the SRHA did grant only the right to enter
the surface of the parcel being developed, Congress modified that grant
with the 1931 amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act.82 Thus, the court
found that Entek can use the surface above any lease in the unit, as long
as the use is reasonably incident to the development of minerals of any
lease within the unit.83
Stull claimed that Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith84 should control because that court stated that unitization does not affect surface
rights unless the mineral leases have been actually or legally modified.85
The district court agreed with Stull by concluding that Mountain Fuel
Supply meant, “Entek’s access to Stull’s surface estate is limited to the
geographic boundaries of the lease from which Entek intends to extract
minerals.”86 The Tenth Circuit rejected Stull’s argument and the district
court’s holding because the Focus Ranch Unit Agreement legally modified the lease by stating that development on one parcel of land in the
unit is deemed to occur on all parcels within the unit.87
Next, Stull argued that it was not a party to the Focus Ranch Unit
Agreement, so the agreement should not be binding on it.88 The only real
argument made for why that matters is that federal policy is too generous
to the mineral owners at the expense of the surface owners.89 The court

78. Id. at 1255.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1255–56.
83. Id. at 1256.
84. 471 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1973). Mountain Fuel Supply addressed the issue of whether a
mineral developer could use the surface of the land surrounding the parcel it was developing because
the lands had been unitized. Id. at 596. The court found that because the defendant had obtained title
to all of the separate tracts in question, they were to be treated as one for the purposes of mineral
development, subject to the geographic boundaries stated in the lease. Id. at 597. However, the court
stated that unitization has no effect on a field, unless the unitization actually or legally modifies the
mineral leases. Id. Thus, the mineral developer could not use the defendants’ surface for development of minerals under the lands of others in this case because, unlike in Entek, the unitization
agreement did not modify the leases to allow for the surface use of any parcel. Id.
85. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1257.
86. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1339 (D. Colo. 2013)
(citing Mountain Fuel Supply, 471 F.2d at 597).
87. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1257.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1258.
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rejected this argument by stating that “it is for Congress to set policy and
this court to construe it.”90
Stull’s final argument was that nonmutual offensive issue preclusion barred Entek’s claim..91 There must be privity between the party in
the previous litigation and the party in the current litigation for nonmutual offensive issue preclusion to apply.92 Privity is the existence of a relationship where the party in the previous litigation was protecting the
rights of the party in the current litigation, in addition to its own rights.93
The court found that Clayton Williams and Entek were closely related
parties but were not in privity because the agreement between Williams
and Stull was not meant to protect the rights of any future lessees.94
Thus, nonmutual offensive issue preclusion did not bar Entek’s claim in
this case.95
Therefore, the court determined that Stull could use as much of the
surface as is reasonably incident to developing the minerals on the BLM
land because of the Focus Ranch Unit Agreement.96 The court vacated
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Stull and remanded
the case for further proceedings.97
III. ANALYSIS
In this part, I will first discuss the difficulty in resolving the issues
between surface and mineral owners. Next, I will discuss whether Entek
signals a shift away from the recent trend of increased rights for surface
owners. After that, I will address whether Entek will have an effect on
non-unitized leases. Finally, I will conclude with a few recommendations
for improving relations between surface and mineral owners: (1) providing advance notice to the other party before taking action; (2) obtaining
consensual surface use and right-of-way agreements; (3) directionally
drilling; (4) selling mineral rights to the surface owner; and (5) including
explicit surface use requirements in the mineral lease.

90. Id.
91. Id. Nonmutual offensive issue preclusion is defined as the “plaintiff seek[ing] . . . to
prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue decided against the defendant in a previous action
involving . . . a different party.” Note, Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Against States, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 792, 792 n.4 (1996). The court appears to have misused this term, as Stull was the defendant,
but there is not much difference between offensive and defensive issue preclusion. Id.
92. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1258.
93. Id. The definition of privity is “[t]he connection or relationship between two parties, each
having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter (such as a . . . proceeding . . . ).”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1320 (9th ed. 2009).
94. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1259.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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A. The Difficult Dilemma Between the Rights of Surface Owners and
Mineral Owners
Severed estates, land where two different parties own the surface
and the minerals under the surface, have resulted in a large number of
disputes.98 Entek was one such dispute that resulted because of a severed
estate. In order to better understand these disputes, it is helpful to have a
brief history of how many severed estates came to be in existence.
Historically, minerals belonged to the surface owner or the government of the country in which they were located.99 In England, gold and
silver mines belonged to the Crown, but all other mines generally belonged to the landowner, so long as a conveyance had not severed
them.100 In 1785, Congress briefly adopted this concept of government
ownership of minerals by passing an ordinance reserving one-third of all
precious minerals to the government.101 In 1807, Congress attempted to
reserve and lease lead mines in Missouri, but the program lasted only
until 1829.102 Despite these efforts to reserve minerals to the government,
there were very few severed estates in the U.S. until the mid-nineteenth
century and early twentieth century.103 A number of legislative acts designed to encourage people to settle the west brought about this expansion of severed estates.104
The Agricultural Homestead Act of 1862 was the first free land
grant provided by the federal government to encourage expansion westward.105 This Act did not reserve the minerals to the federal government.106 It did, however, allow the surface owner to create a severed estate by selling the land and reserving some or all of the minerals to himself, selling the minerals and keeping the surface, or leasing the minerals
to someone else.107
Beginning in 1909, Congress began reserving the minerals under
the lands it granted to homesteaders to the federal government.108 However, the Coal Land Acts of 1909 and 1910 reserved only coal to the fed-

98. Mergen, supra note 3, at 420.
99. Truhe, supra note 19, at 380.
100. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 4.03 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Found. ed., 2d ed.
1983).
101. Truhe, supra note 19, at 380. This ordinance was no longer valid after the end of the
Continental Congress. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 100, § 4.08.
102. 1 AMERICAN MINING LAW, supra note 100, §4.08.
103. See Truhe, supra note 19, at 380–82. Between 1909 and 1948, the federal government
reserved all of the minerals underlying over 35 million acres, in addition to the minerals that it
reserved under the 33 million acres granted under the SRHA. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 2013 71–73 (2014).
104. Truhe, supra note 19, at 380–81.
105. Id. at 381.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 381–82.

2015]

UPHOLDING THE DOMINANCE OF THE MINERAL ESTATE

11

eral government.109 The SRHA, the act granting the land in Entek,110 was
the first act that generally reserved all of the valuable minerals underlying the land to the federal government.111 These acts created huge swaths
of land where some or all of the minerals were severed from the surface.112 Severed estates are still very common today. As of 2013, the
federal government still owns the minerals underlying 57.2 million acres
of private lands.113 These severed estates are almost entirely located west
of the Mississippi River.114
With that history in mind, we can now move on to discuss how disputes between owners of severed estates are resolved. The mineral estate
has long been considered the dominant estate.115 This means that the
mineral owner generally has a right to use the surface to develop the underlying minerals without interference from the surface owner.116 Originally, the mineral owner could use as much of the surface as was reasonably necessary to explore for and develop the underlying minerals.117 The
right to use the surface has been limited over the years to further take
into account the interests of the surface owner,118 as will be discussed
further in the next subsection.
There may not be a perfect solution to the disputes between surface
owners and minerals owners. On one hand, you have the surface owner,
who may use his or her land for a purpose that is vital to his or her livelihood, such as farming or, in the case of Entek, a hunting business.119 On
the other hand, you have a mineral owner, who has a right to develop the
minerals underneath that surface estate. It is fairly easy to see how this
could lead to disputes between the two parties.
Courts have diminished the common law doctrine that the mineral
estate has absolute dominance over the surface estate to some degree,
through rules such as the accommodation doctrine,120 but the mineral
estate is still the dominant estate.121 It must remain the dominant estate

109. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 877 (1999) (holding that coalbed
methane gas was not included in the reservation of coal).
110. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 2014).
111. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 878.
112. Truhe, supra note 19, at 382 (stating that 33 million acres were patented under the SRHA
alone).
113. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 103, at 7.
114. Id. (listing only 300,000 acres of split estates in states east of, or bordering, the Mississippi).
115. Mergen, supra note 3, at 432.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 433.
119. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014).
120. The accommodation doctrine requires the mineral developer to use reasonable alternatives
to mitigate the impact on existing surface uses, if alternatives are shown to exist. Lowe, supra note
11, at 198; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
121. Truhe, supra note 19, at 390–91.
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because there is no value in the mineral estate otherwise.122 The mineral
estate’s value is derived from the right to develop the minerals, which
cannot be accomplished without access to the surface.123
The Entek court realized the importance of the mineral estate retaining its dominance, in holding that Entek had a right to cross Stull’s land
to develop the minerals.124 This comports with the traditional notions of
property and mineral development law.125 While it is understandable to
feel some compassion for Stull because this ruling may greatly affect its
business, the court followed the law as written and not as some would
like it to be written.126 Unfortunately for Stull, as the court noted, the
policy argument that the current law favors mineral owners disproportionately to surface owners must be made to legislators, rather than the
courts.127
Stull knew or should have known that mineral development could
occur on its land at some point.128 In fact, it is undisputed that Entek
could use Stull’s surface, if it was drilling a well on Stull’s property.129
Thus, Stull took a risk, by starting a hunting operation on its surface, that
someday its business may be altered by a mineral lessee developing the
minerals on the property.
The Entek ruling affirms the traditional notion that the mineral estate is the dominant estate.130 It may seem that this is an expansion of that
doctrine. However, based on the language of the Focus Ranch Unit
Agreement and the legislative intent of the unitization amendment to the
Mineral Leasing Act, it is really just a statement that the mineral owner
can use as much of the surface on any parcel within a unit as is reasonably necessary to develop the minerals underneath any surface within that
unit. This is only a slight variation on the traditional rule.

122. Id. at 385.
123. Id.
124. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1256.
125. Under common law that has been in existence for decades, the mineral developer, as the
owner of the dominant estate, has an implied right to use the surface estate in any way reasonably
necessary for mineral exploration and development. Ernest E. Smith, The Growing Demand for Oil
and Gas and the Potential Impact Upon Rural Land, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 7, 10
(2008).
126. Micheli, supra note 22, at 33 (arguing that surface owners often see the law regarding
split estates as unfairly favoring the mineral estate).
127. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1258. The court did note that the Takings Clause of the Constitution
could potentially have provided Stull some relief; however, Stull failed to make that argument. Id. at
1257–58.
128. Witwer, supra note 4, at 69 (concluding that surface owners are on constructive notice, if
not actual notice, that mineral development may occur, no matter how many times the land has
changed hands).
129. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1255.
130. Smith, supra note 125, at 10.
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B. Is Entek a Shift Away from Increased Protection for Surface Owners?
As was previously stated, the trend has been to move away from the
dominance of the mineral estate.131 Along with the accommodation doctrine, surface damage statutes and mineral dormancy acts have increased
protection for surface owners.132
North Dakota passed the first surface damage statute in 1975 for
coal mining and passed a similar statute applying to oil and gas in
1979.133 Since the North Dakota surface damage statutes were passed,
eight other states have passed some version of a surface damage statute.134 The North Dakota statute requires mineral developers to compensate surface owners for “the lost value of land and improvements, and the
lost use of surface access.”135 Thus, surface owners have the ability to
obtain compensation for more damage than they would have had the
mineral estate retained its traditional dominance over the surface estate.
States are also limiting the mineral estate’s dominance through mineral dormancy acts.136 Mineral dormancy acts “allow ownership of the
mineral estate, under specified conditions, to revert to the surface owner.”137 In Texaco, Inc. v. Short,138 the Supreme Court upheld mineral
dormancy acts as constitutional because ownership of a mineral estate is
not a constitutional property right.139 Therefore, states have the power to
extinguish mineral estate ownership.140
In Entek, the court appeared, at least at first glance, to buck the
trend of providing additional rights for surface owners and move back
toward the dominance of the mineral estate. When looking into the decision further, however, it appears that the court may have favored the
dominance of the mineral estate more than some courts,141 but not much,
given the language of the statutes, the unit agreement, and traditional
mineral development law.

131. Mergen, supra note 3, at 433.
132. See John F. Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners: Changes in the Dominant/Serviant
Relationship Between the Mineral and Surface Estates, 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-14 to
-29 (1994).
133. Id. at 22-14.
134. Id. at 433 (claiming that North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Illinois, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and Texas all have some form of surface damage act).
135. Mergen, supra note 3, at 434. The Eight Circuit upheld this statute, primarily because it
did not take away the mineral owner’s right to enter the surface to develop the minerals. Id. at 434
n.109 (citing Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984)).
136. See Welborn, supra note 132, at 22-27.
137. Id.
138. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
139. Welborn, supra note 132, at 22-28.
140. Id.
141. See Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo. 1997) (requiring the
mineral lessee to take into account the surface owner’s rights and to use reasonable alternatives, if
available); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (1971) (requiring the mineral lessee to adopt
alternatives when available, if an existing use by the surface owner would be precluded or impaired).
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Under the SRHA, the mineral developer has the right to “re-enter
and occupy so much of the surface thereof as may be required for all
purposes reasonably incident to the mining or removal of the coal or other minerals . . . .”142 Thus, mineral developers have always been required
to use the surface in a reasonable manner, but the accommodation doctrine takes that a step further.
The Supreme Court of Texas created the accommodation doctrine,143 and courts in numerous states have followed it.144 The accommodation doctrine requires mineral developers to use alternative methods
that are less harmful to the surface estate when developing subsurface
minerals, if alternatives are shown to exist.145 This may even require the
developer to use alternatives that are more costly than the developer’s
preferred method of development.146 The accommodation doctrine is also
called the due regard doctrine because it requires the mineral developer
to “give due regard to the rights of the surface owner.”147 However, the
surface owner has the burden of showing that the surface use is unreasonable and that reasonable alternatives to that use exist.148 While no
court has specifically addressed whether the accommodation doctrine
applies to federal mineral lessees, one district court has found that the
accommodation doctrine does not create a federal question to establish
federal jurisdiction.149 However, other federal courts have applied the
accommodation doctrine to private leases and state units.150
In a case that is very analogous to Entek, Flying Diamond Corp. v.
Rust,151 the Utah Supreme Court required that a mineral developer use an
alternate route to access its development site because the alternate route
was reasonable, and the surface owner would not have been able to use
the surface for agriculture if the alternative route was not used.152 The
Flying Diamond court went on to state that the mineral developer must
use alternatives, if the alternatives are “reasonable and practical ‘under
142. 43 U.S.C. §299(a).
143. Mergen, supra note 3, at 434 (citing Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d 618).
144. See, e.g., Gerrity, 946 P.2d at 927; Mergen, supra note 3, at 434 (citing Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1974), Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d
894 (N.M. 1985), Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976)).
145. Truhe, supra note 19, at 388.
146. Id.
147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Mergen, supra note 3, at 435.
149. BTU W. Res., Inc. v. Berenergy, Corp., 31 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1350, 1352 (D. Wyo. 2014)
(holding that the “Accommodation Doctrine is a traditional state law doctrine[,]” so the court cannot
create a federal accommodation doctrine without altering the balance between federal and state
judiciaries).
150. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thunderhead Investments, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1173
(D. Colo. 2002) (applying the accommodation doctrine principles from Gerrity to a lease from a
private party); Fisher v. Continental Res., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 637, 641 (D.N.D. 2014) (applying the
accommodation doctrine adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court to a unit created by the state).
151. 551 P.2d 509.
152. Mergen, supra note 3, at 435 (citing Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511
(Utah 1976)).
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the circumstances.’”153 Stull may have had a similar argument in Entek;
however, there is no record that Stull argued for any alternatives in this
case.154 Stull did argue generally that Entek should use “[a]lternative
locations . . . as well as means of operations” to decrease the impact on
Stull’s surface in the district court but did not express what specific alternatives were available to Entek.155
Stull’s failure to argue for specific alternatives, which may or may
not have existed, is most likely the primary reason why the accommodation doctrine did not apply in Entek. “The accommodation doctrine is not
a balancing type test weighing the harm or inconvenience to the owner of
one type of interest against the benefits to the other.”156 The surface
owner has the burden of proving that alternatives exist.157 Once it has
been shown that reasonable alternatives exist, the court will then balance
the interests of the surface and mineral owners.158
In Entek, based on the record before the court, the only available
access road to Entek’s well on the BLM land ran through Stull’s land.159
Thus, Entek’s use of the road must be considered reasonable because it
was the only access point, and no reasonable alternatives were brought to
the court’s attention. This comports with the accommodation doctrine
because the mineral estate is still dominant under that doctrine, so long
as the mineral developer’s surface use gives due regard to the rights of
the surface owner and no reasonable alternatives are shown to exist.160
Following this reasoning, Entek still has the right to use the only access
road in order to develop the minerals that it has leased because the mineral estate is dominant.
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Entek does not appear to
alter the accommodation doctrine or expand the rights of the mineral
estate. It simply grants Entek the reasonable use of the surface afforded
to it by the SRHA, the 1931 amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act, and
the Focus Ranch Unit Agreement.

153. Id. at 436 (quoting Flying Diamond, 551 P.2d at 511).
154. See Appellee’s Brief, Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir.
2014) (No. 13-1172).
155. Stull Ranches, LLC’s Amended Third Counterclaim, Entek GRB, LLC, v. Stull Ranches,
LLC, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (D. Colo. 2013) (No. 11-cv-01557-PAB-KLM). Stull did recommend
directionally drilling from the BLM land, but that alternative relates only to development of the
minerals under Stull’s land, not access to the well on the BLM land, which was the subject of this
case. Id.
156. Truhe, supra note 19, at 389 (quoting Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 137
(N.D. 1979)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014).
160. Truhe, supra note 19, at 389.
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C. Effect on Access to Non-Unitized Leases
In Entek, the Tenth Circuit determined that the surface of all tracts
of land within federal units can be used by mineral developers as if they
were one parcel.161 The court placed a lot of weight on the Focus Ranch
Unit Agreement’s provision that “mining activity on any leasehold in the
unitized area is deemed to occur on all leaseholds.”162 The Colorado unitization statute provides that “[a]ll operations . . . upon any portion of the
unit area shall be deemed for all purposes the conduct of such operations
upon each separately owned tract in the unit area . . . .”163 Based on the
language of the Colorado statute, it is likely that mineral developers
holding leases joined into state units in Colorado could use the surface of
the entire unit as well. So the next question is whether Entek has an effect on a mineral developer’s right to access non-unitized lands. In order
to determine the effect on non-unitized lands, it is important to first discuss unitization and why the Entek court ruled the way it did.
Stull’s land was part of a 40,000 acre unit, created by the Focus
Ranch Unit Agreement.164 When land is unitized, the lessor generally
receives a share of the royalty proportionate to the amount of land that it
has in the unit, regardless of which tract of land contains the producing
well.165 Unitization is meant to conserve resources and prevent waste, as
well as protect landowners’ correlative rights.166 Unitization under the
Mineral Leasing Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to approve the
unitization agreement.167 In approving the unitization agreement, the
Secretary is modifying the terms of leases contained within the unit.168
Thus, the unitization agreements, once approved, modify the prior individual leases where the terms are inconsistent.
The Focus Ranch Unit Agreement stated that mineral development
on any tract within the unit shall be considered to be “performed upon
and for the benefit of each and every tract of unitized land.”169 Because
the unitization agreement combined all of the tracts within the unit into
one for purposes of production, the terms of the unitization agreement
are what granted Entek access to Stull’s surface estate. Once it was determined that the unitization agreement essentially created a single tract
of land for purposes of production, it is clear that Entek could use as

161. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1256.
162. Id.
163. § 34-60-118(9).
164. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1255.
165. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405, 1411 (10th Cir. 1990).
166. Id. at 1410–11. Correlative rights require each landowner overlying a common reservoir
to refrain from interfering with the ability of the other landowners to exercise their right to capture
the underlying minerals. LOWE ET AL., supra note 10, at 60.
167. 30 U.S.C. § 226(m).
168. Id.
169. Entek, 763 F.3d at 1255.
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much of the surface as was reasonably required to develop the minerals,
based on the rights granted by the SRHA.
When it comes to accessing non-unitized tracts of land, the result
will likely be quite different. In a situation similar to Entek, where a mineral lessee holds leases underlying multiple tracts of adjacent land but the
leases are not unitized, the law allows access to only the tract under
which the minerals will be developed.170 The mineral producer would not
be allowed to cross one tract to produce the minerals on an adjacent tract,
even if it holds leases to both tracts.171
It may also be difficult for a mineral developer to gain access to
leases on federal or state lands.172 When the BLM leases minerals to private parties, it does not guarantee access to those minerals.173 Access to
previously issued federal leases across federal lands may be denied, if it
is determined to be in the public interest to do so.174 State land departments also have the authority to limit right of way access to protect state
interests.175 Thus, both the federal government and the states also have
the authority to shut off access to landlocked mineral leases.
Entek is not likely to extend to these types of situations, where a
private party or the federal or state government on non-unitized lands
blocks the mineral lessee out. The ruling in Entek was primarily based on
the unitization agreement essentially creating one parcel,176 which is not
the case simply because a lessee does not have access to the surface of a
parcel to which it holds the mineral rights. If it is a private party, the
mineral lessee can attempt to negotiate with the surface owner to reach a
right-of-way agreement.177 If it is federal or state land, the mineral lessee
may be burdened by significant restrictions or denied access altogether.178
D. Recommendations for Improving Surface Estate/Mineral Estate Relations
As discussed previously, the tension is often high between surface
and mineral owners of severed estates. This subsection will set forth a
few recommendations for easing that tension: (1) providing advance notice to the other party before taking action; (2) obtaining consensual surface use and right-of-way agreements; (3) directionally drilling; (4) sell170. Clyde O. Martz, Rebecca Love & Charles L. Kaiser, Access to Mineral Interests by Right,
Permit, Condemnation or Purchase, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1075, 1078 (1982).
171. Id.
172. “[N]o right of access exists by necessity across private lands to reach federal lands . . . .”
Id. at 1079 (citing Leo Sheep v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979)).
173. Id. at 1094.
174. Id. at 1095.
175. Id. at 1099.
176. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1256 (10th Cir. 2014).
177. Martz et al., supra note 170, at 1080.
178. Id. at 1095–96, 1099.
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ing mineral rights to the surface owner; and (5) including explicit surface
use requirements in the mineral lease.
1. Providing Advance Notice to the Other Party before Taking Action
The first way to ease tension is to provide notice to all parties with
interests in a severed estate when one party plans to exercise its rights. In
Colorado, a state statute requires the surface owner to notify mineral
owners at least 30 days before a public hearing on a surface development
application.179 The surface owner is also required to inform the local
government of the name and address of the mineral owner.180 Colorado
also requires that oil and gas developers give notice to the local government, so that a public comment period, on-site inspection, and a hearing
can take place, prior to the issuance of a drilling permit.181
Additionally, the mineral estate should make an effort ensure that
the surface owner is aware that the estate is severed, even though the
surface owner may be on constructive notice if the conveyance has been
recorded.182 Some companies have gone further than this and have even
implemented public education programs to better inform the public about
the ramifications of severed estates.183 By making the other parties aware
earlier, the owners of severed estates will reduce the risk of issues arising
after they have invested a lot of time and money into their use of their
estate. Advance notice will also make it more likely that the parties will
be able to reach a consensual agreement regarding surface use, which is
discussed further in the next paragraphs.
2. Obtaining Consensual Surface Use and Right-of-Way Agreements
The next suggestion for improving surface/mineral relations is obtaining consensual surface use and right-of-way agreements. It is in the
best interest of both parties to come to an agreement about the best place
for access roads and mineral production operations. Some people have
pushed for the states to make surface agreements mandatory.184 This has
been mostly unsuccessful, however, because mineral estate owners do
not want to give up some of their dominance.185 In Colorado, mineral
179. Jeffrey R. Fiske & Ann E. Lane, Urbanization of the Oil Patch: What Happens When
They Pave Paradise and Put Up a Parking Lot?, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1, 15-14 (2003).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 15-16.
182. Id. at 15-26.
183. Id. at 15-27.
184. LoValerie Mullins, The Equity Illusion of Surface Ownership in Coalbed Methane Gas;
the Rise of Mutual Simultaneous Rights in Mineral Law and the Resulting Need for Dispute Resolution in Split Estate Relations, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 191 (2009).
185. See id. (noting that Montana has defeated all such regulation attempts, but Wyoming has
passed a statute that requires surface use agreements).
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developers must consult with the surface owner in good faith regarding
location of its operations on the surface.186
As the dominant estate, the mineral owner will be able to access the
surface regardless of whether a consensual agreement can be reached.
Because of this inequality in bargaining power, the surface owner will
generally have to pay more if it wants a more restrictive surface use
agreement.187 The SRHA does require that mineral developers post bond
if they cannot reach an agreement with the surface owner, but the bond
covers only damage to “crops and tangible improvements.”188 However,
if both parties can come to an agreement about how mineral development
will occur, it will lead to less hassle and potentially fewer lawsuits. Additionally, these negotiations may lead to reasonable alternatives that the
surface owner could use to invoke the accommodation doctrine, if an
agreement cannot be reached and a lawsuit arises.
3. Directionally Drilling
With the advancements in directional drilling,189 surface owners often seek this option when determining where to place a drill site.190 Directional drilling minimizes surface impact by allowing developers to
drill more wells from a single well pad.191 It is not clear whether the accommodation doctrine would require directional drilling, so most mineral developers simply consider it a convenience and require that the surface owner pay for this additional cost.192 However, surface owners are
increasingly arguing that mineral developers should pay for the increased
cost of directional drilling due to the accommodation doctrine.193
The primary concerns with an agreement to directionally drill are
that the mineral developer will not drill the well because it may become
uneconomical or that the surface developer will no longer be around to
pay if the well is drilled in the future.194 To resolve these issues, one
commentator suggested that the contributions by the surface developer
could be placed in escrow and released to the mineral developer when
the well is drilled or released back to the surface developer if a well is
186. Jean Feriancek, Competing Mineral and Surface Development—One State’s Struggle,
NAT. RESOURCES ENVTL., Summer 2002, at 36, 37.
187. Id.
188. 43 U.S.C. §299(a).
189. A directional well is a well that is not drilled only vertically but rather is curved or horizontal. Evan J. House, Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for Unconventional Oil and
Gas Development, 13 WYO. L. REV. 5, 19 (2013). Recently, technological advancements in horizontal drilling processes and hydraulic fracturing have made oil and gas development more economical
and spurred mineral production. Id. at 9–10.
190. Fiske et al., supra note 179, at 15-32.
191. House, supra note 189, at 20. By using fewer well pads, the impact on the surface is
further reduced because fewer roads are needed to gain access to the pads. Id.
192. Fiske et al., supra note 179, at 15-32.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 15-33.
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not drilled within a specified period of time.195 This would allow both
parties to develop the surface and the minerals on their own schedule
without fear of losing out on their agreement.
4. Selling Mineral Rights to the Surface Owner
Another option to ease tension between the parties is to sell the
mineral rights to the surface owner. This can include selling the lease,
any currently existing wells, or the right to use the surface.196
A few caveats are required with this option. When selling the mineral rights, it is important to examine the terms of the lease to determine
if there is any obligation to the royalty owners or working interest partners to actually develop the minerals.197 This will help avoid potentially
unforeseen problems due to the lack of mineral development.198 Additionally, the surface owner that is purchasing the mineral rights needs to
be aware that there may be multiple mineral lessees of the different subsurface formations.199 If there are multiple owners of the mineral rights to
different formations, the surface owner will need to purchase the mineral
rights from each mineral owner to ensure that no development takes
place on the surface. Finally, if purchasing only a lease, the surface developer needs to be aware of when the lease ends and take steps to ensure
that the mineral owner does not lease the property to another mineral
developer.200
5. Including Explicit Surface Use Requirements In the Mineral
Lease
My final recommendation is to explicitly place surface use requirements in the lease. This will not work in many instances, as the current
surface owner may not have been the party that executed the lease,201 or
the land may have been severed prior to surface owner gaining ownership.202 If the surface owner is the party executing the lease, this will help

195. Id.
196. Id. at 15-35.
197. Id. The implied covenant to develop requires a lessee that has drilled a well to “continue
to develop as would a reasonable prudent operator under the circumstances.” LOWE ET AL., supra
note 10, at 363.
198. This statement assumes that the surface owner is purchasing the mineral rights in order to
stop a mineral owner from using the surface and does not plan to develop the minerals itself.
199. Fiske et al., supra note 179, at 15-38 (explaining that in the DJ Basin, one developer may
hold rights to develop the “J” Sand and another might hold rights to develop the Codell/Niobrara).
200. See id.
201. See Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex. 1971) (“In 1955 Jones purchased
the 635 acre tract of land in question, which was subject to prior mineral leases in which he acquired
no interest.”).
202. See Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Stull
is the successor in interest to land grants provided under the 1916 Act.”).
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because when interpreting contracts, the first place that courts look is the
explicit language of a lease.203
Surface damage liability is one important clause that could be
placed in a lease. Generally, a mineral developer is required to compensate the surface owner only for damage to crops and agricultural improvements.204 So by placing explicit language in the lease, the parties
can have a clear understanding of what damage will be compensable.
By working together, both the surface and mineral owners will be
more likely to avoid unnecessary hassles and expensive litigation. It is
important to remember that the mineral estate has the implied right to use
the surface to develop the underlying minerals,205 so it is in the best interests of the surface owner to compromise to ensure it has some say in
how the mineral owner uses the surface.
These recommendations will not work in all situations, and disputes
between surface owners and mineral owners will likely continue to arise
as long as severed estates exist. However, if surface and mineral owners
attempt to work together, it is more likely that fewer disputes will arise
when developing our country’s valuable subsurface minerals.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit, in Entek, correctly found that unitization gives
mineral owners a right of access across adjacent parcels within a unit, if
it is reasonably necessary for mineral development. While this may seem
to erode the rights of surface owners, it really just upholds the goals of
unitization and efficient mineral development. This ruling does not seem
to change the accommodation doctrine or other protections surface owners have gained in recent years. Entek simply gives the mineral developer
the ability to develop the minerals that it has leased, which may also benefit the surface owner whose land the mineral developer uses for access.
Mineral development is incredibly important in the United States,
due to the large amount oil and gas consumed.206 Unfortunately, the bur-

203. See 16 John R. Paddock Jr., WEST’S COLORADO PRACTICE SERIES, § 5.5(b) (2d ed. 2013)
(explaining that the goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the parties,
which is determined primarily from the express language of the contract).
204. John M. Stocker, Jr., Protection for Surface Owners of Federally Reserved Mineral
Lands, 2 UCLA ALASKA L. REV. 171, 172 (1972-1973).
205. Truhe, supra note 19, at 392.
206. The United States consumed 18.49 million barrels of petroleum products per day and just
over 25.53 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2012. Overview data for United States, U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=US#pet (last
updated May 30, 2013).
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dens on the surface estate are a necessary evil of mineral development.
Entek ensures that these minerals can be produced in the most efficient
way possible by following traditional property and mineral development
law and upholding the dominance of the mineral estate.
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